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PARTY CHOICE AND SUPPORT FOR DEMAGOGUES: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION*

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The relationship of parties to democracy and to political stability has concerned scholars for years.¹ Extant party systems have almost continually been under attack by reformers bent on achieving various objectives, among them greater party responsibility, greater honesty, and greater efficiency of governmental operation.² But party systems have not suffered from a lack of defenders: reformers have often been engaged in vigorous debate. Such controversy, apart from the merits of the arguments on either side, focuses attention on a number of interesting empirical propositions about parties in democratic systems. These propositions, unfortunately, have not often been put to rigorous systematic test.

For example, defenders of the American party system in particular point out that an important function of parties is the guiding of social conflict into moderate, non-revolutionary

* The order of the authors' names should not be interpreted to imply seniority of authorship. This is a joint enterprise. The authors wish to thank the University of Kentucky Research Foundation for financial support of the research upon which this article is based.

¹Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Sigmund Neumann (ed.), *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 395-421; Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York: John Wiley Science Editions, 1963), pp. 116-132, 275-280; M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1922), Vol. II, pp. 651-662; Frank J. Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System* (Boston: Little, Brown Co., 1966), pp. 8-12.

²Report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York: Rinehart, 1950); E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Rinehart, 1942), pp. 206-210; James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 325-332; However also see Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954).

modes of expression.³ Attempts at reform, goes the argument, should be considered as to whether they might interfere with this beneficial function. Citizens are viewed as having inherent tendencies to perform destabilizing political acts or to vote for extremist political figures. Somehow, we are told, these citizens are restrained from indulging these immoderate predispositions by the party system.⁴ In a sense, the argument continues, parties save the great unwashed from themselves; all democrats should be thankful that they do and appreciate them for this service.

What empirical ground is there for believing that parties contribute to behavior patterns productive of stability and moderation in democracies? Though not abundant, there is some evidence that where parties are not highly salient for citizens, voting behavior destabilizing to the political system may take place. Where there is no voter commitment to party *qua* party, an immoderate politics seems more likely. Party may be replaced by or act as a vehicle for 1) personal candidate characteristics or 2) ideological principle. Either contingency may enhance the prospects for electoral success of high-temperature demagogues. An often-cited example of the first is to be found in the American South. In this one-party region, voters frequently are denied the opportunity to cognize meaningful electoral alternatives in terms of party. Victory in the Democratic primary has been tantamount to election. Apparently, at least in some areas, loyalty to faction has not been the functional

³Clinton Rossiter, *Parties and Politics in America* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 39; V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 5th. ed. (New York: Crowell, 1964), pp. 200-205; Alan Nevins, "The Strength of Our Political System," *New York Times Magazine* (July 18, 1948), pp. 5ff.

⁴Edward C. Banfield, "In Defense of the American Party System," in Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), *Political Parties, U.S.A.* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1964), pp. 21-39; Aaron B. Wildavsky, "On the Superiority of National Conventions," *Review of Politics*, 24 (July, 1962), 307-319.

equivalent of party loyalty. Factions engender only transient allegiances resulting in a very volatile electoral process.⁵ There is a great deal of unattached political affect which can be capitalized upon by irresponsible demagogues of the moment.⁶ "Perhaps a clue to the picturesque quality of southern political leaders lies in the fact that attention-getting antics function as a substitute for party . . . in the organization of support."⁷

The contention that voter commitment to party mutes ideological fervor is often found in comparisons of the American two-party system and European multi-party systems. In France, we are told, partisan conflict reflects controversy over basic questions of political community and regime.⁸ Everything is a matter of principle. Voters do not develop enduring loyalties to party, but rather to positions or "*tendances*." Accordingly, parties themselves are secondary, even transient. "Flash parties," probably committed to some extreme position, threaten to disrupt the polity only to lose all electoral support and recede a short time later.⁹

Evidence is by no means firm, but there is some suggestion that non-partisan elections in the United States provide arenas for successful presentation of strident appeals. Though partisan voting loyalties often continue to intrude upon non-partisan contests,¹⁰ such elections sometimes do provide opportunities for voters to indulge sentiments about groups for which they have negative valences without repudiating their party.¹¹ Structuring of the election by party is apparently replaced not by issue content, but more likely by "religious, ethnic, or other extra-

neous associations,"¹² perhaps with overtones of viciousness.

Finally, referenda require voters to structure balloting situations without benefit of party. Once more there is slight evidence that this kind of situation allows demagogic approaches to find support. Under some conditions, referenda produce rather high rates of participation among normally electorally inert segments of the population. Moreover, such persons demonstrate a great propensity to reject referendum proposals.¹³ These phenomena are especially likely to occur in response to demagogic appeals. "When distrust of . . . the powerful generally, allegations of conspiracy or of behind the scenes maneuvering for personal gain, unrestrained personal attacks . . . characterize the opposition campaign,"¹⁴ referenda are likely to be defeated.

Thus, though the evidence here presented is fragmentary and varied, it is reasonable to expect that where electoral choices are likely to be perceived in terms of party alternatives, the probability of successful appeals by extreme candidates will be quite low. This literature performs a very important service in bringing evidence to bear on the substantive proposition that viable parties are associated with moderate politics. However, it leaves the really interesting questions largely unanswered in that few convincing, general *explanations* of the phenomenon are offered. To be sure, the task of explanation is a formidable one. It is the modest goal of this paper to sketch out two general interpretations and offer some evidence which bears on their relative merits.

I. THE POLITICAL EXPLANATION

In this approach, parties *per se* act as causal agents in electoral choice, for they function as political educators. This explanation is manifested most clearly in the literature on party identification. The "psychological attachment" to party connoted by that term can be extremely useful for an electorate. Party becomes a beacon in a confusing political world of which each voter cannot have complete knowledge.¹⁵

¹² Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," this REVIEW, 46 (September, 1952), 773.

¹³ John E. Horton and Wayne E. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums," *American Journal of Sociology*, 67 (March, 1962), 485-493.

¹⁴ Clarence N. Stone, "Local Referendums: An Alternative to the Alienated Voter Model," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Summer, 1965), 216.

¹⁵ Angus Campbell, *et. al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 120-167.

⁵ V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 46-52.

⁶ In the sense that there are no relatively stable blocs of voters to whom they must defer for support.

⁷ Key, *Southern Politics*, p. 46.

⁸ Alfred Grosser, "France: Nothing but Opposition," in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 289-292.

⁹ Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Spring, 1962), 1-24.

¹⁰ Robert H. Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," this REVIEW, 57 (September, 1963), 589.

¹¹ J. David Greenstone, *A Report on the Politics of Detroit* (Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1961), pp. II-7, II-8.

“. . . [T]he parties themselves serve as the significant source of political direction for the electorate. . . . As the . . . major source of political education, they create a public image of politics as a competition between parties *per se*. . . . In such a situation, politics tends to lose its ideological character; the public is not stimulated to inform itself regarding specific policies; its political role becomes one of deciding who shall manage the government, not what shall the government do. For the bulk of the electorate, this decision is determined by long-established party loyalties. . . .”¹⁶ The prominence of this cognitive device in electoral decisions among American voters is well established. Moreover, its role in maintaining the non-ideological, stable character of American politics is suggested by cross-national research which demonstrates the absence of widespread party identification in more turbulent political systems.¹⁷

Using different kinds of data and insight, other writers describe a highly positive and specific role for parties in the determination of voting behavior. Parties, once they are established, allegedly encourage, supervise, persuade, cajole, educate, electioneer, and organize electorates so that they respond to party symbols.¹⁸ This response, we are told, entails a large number of “desirable” consequences, not the least of which is the moderation of political conflict. The rallying of popular support by parties is seen as “the functional equivalent of revolution.”¹⁹ This fortunate “sublimation” of the electorates’ dangerous impulses of course means less extreme practice, less violence, and fewer demagogues.

To some extent, the political approach begs the question of why in some democracies, extant parties fail in their educative task. The French voter does not perceive his voting alternatives in terms of party to the extent that the American does. And the French are allegedly more prone to favor demagogues. But parties in France, like those in the U.S., have enjoyed a long existence.

¹⁶ Angus Campbell and Henry Valen, “Party Identification in Norway and the United States,” in Angus Campbell, *et. al.*, (eds.), *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 267.

¹⁷ Converse and Dupeux, *loc cit.*

¹⁸ Hugh Clokie, “The Modern Party State,” *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 15 (May, 1949), 142-143; Robert MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 211-214; E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 59.

¹⁹ Key, *Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups*, p. 203.

What makes for party viability, for successful education, for ability to present meaningful symbols to the electorate? Additional explanation is necessary. However, the approach does focus our attention on the possibility that parties can have an independent impact once the conditions of their viability are met. This caveat leads to consideration of the second major interpretation.

II. THE CULTURAL EXPLANATION

In this approach to the disassociation of party-defined electoral choice and success of demagogues, parties are not causal agents to all. Indeed, they are epiphenomenal. If they are associated with moderate political behavior, it is not because they condition the behavior, but because their existence and moderate behavior are both dependent upon the same cultural conditions. Once cultural orientations are such as to produce moderation, appropriate party institutions will develop to act as vehicles for political expression.

There are several scholars who stress the cultural antecedents of moderate, stable democracy, and most of them attribute to party an expressive or attendant (rather than causal) role. In an extensive five-nation study is described the “civic culture,” certainly the very antithesis of a condition which would lead to the making of electoral choices on the basis of attraction to demagogues. This culture is defined by a configuration of personal feelings and attitudes. Where many people feel an obligation to participate in the electoral process, where there is a good deal of involvement in the (moderate) activities that customarily surround the selection of leaders, where the population is generally not alienated (feels efficacious), there is likely to exist little prospect for the success of extremists or “messianic movements that lead to democratic instability.”²⁰

But these cultural conditions also entail “patterns of partisanship.” There must be some channel through which these personal feelings can “flow” to have an impact on political affairs. Partisanship provides these. The civic culture is most likely to produce “open” partisans, very moderate voters to whom the notion of party seems very central. Such citizens contrast sharply to partisans bred in non-civic cultures—on the one hand, apathetics who are withdrawn, and on the other hand, intense types or parochials for whom “partisanship is not a political phenomenon, but a cultural-religious one.”²¹

²⁰ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 355.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

Thus it appears that the civic culture not only inhibits the success of demagogues, but creates the underpinnings for competition between viable parties, while other cultures conduce to "messianic" leaders and also lead to situations where party is either unsupported or relegated to vehicle status for other passionately felt concerns.

Lipset's famous study suggests that various "extremist" political movements are engendered by social factors such as isolation, lack of wealth, and illiteracy. To be sure, parties are not ignored. Indeed, where "parties of representation" secure most of the vote, there is likely to exist a stable democratic order. But this is primarily because both the parties and the stability are dependent upon a series of cross-cutting, non-reinforcing social cleavages (which are most likely to occur in integrated, wealthy, literate societies).²² These "cross-pressures" produce such effects by generating a culture of "cosmopolitanism," one characterized by "tolerance," and by "reduced emotion and aggressiveness." Electoral support for party is merely the reflection of such cultural conditions.

The list of advocates of the cultural explanation could be lengthened considerably. A recent "theoretical" explication suggests that vulnerability of democratic government, which may involve citizen susceptibility to the appeals of demagogues, is due to anomie, which is in turn a consequence of "incongruity" between various authority structures in society. Thus, heavily Catholic countries are less likely to remain democracies because the authoritarian structure of religious life is incongruent with democratic political rule.²³ The "strain" thus created renders the masses more susceptible to extreme programs. Parties are not a cause of democracy, for both political parties and democracy have common antecedents. In fact, meaningful partisan elections are "practically synonymous" with democracy.²⁴

III. SOME EMPIRICAL TESTS

Hypotheses. Available evidence dramatically favors neither the political nor the cultural explanation of these phenomena. If party symbols to which the electorate has been educated to respond are not present, voting behavior indeed seems to have more demagogic support potential

than if such symbols are available as choice criteria. On the other hand, the amount of support for the proposition that both demagogic support potential and the presence of effective, symbol-providing parties depend upon cultural conditions is also impressive. Thus, the contrast between these two explanations may appear overdrawn. Probably not even the most fervent apologist for parties would deny that certain social conditions are conducive to stable, non-demagogue-troubled political systems, while others are inimical. Similarly, even extreme social determinists would admit that parties can become established and that measurable effects can flow independently from them.

However, this should not obscure the necessity of additional research on the role of party in demagogic choice by voters. Though extant evidence suggests some role, we certainly do not know *how great* that role is. Indeed, due to the fact that uncontrolled variables often change when party choice criteria change—for example, comparisons between partisan and non-partisan voting entails comparisons of voting for different offices or in different locations—we cannot be absolutely sure that there is a role at all.

Our assessment of the available literature leads us to posit that cultural variables do indeed have a pronounced effect on attractiveness of demagogues to voters, but that over and above this, party choice criteria have a measurable impact—an impact which declines, however, as the values of the cultural variables approach the extremes. That is, some voters may be in conditions which conduce so strongly to support for demagogues that the educative outputs of parties and their provision of symbols in elections have no effect whatever. Demagogues may be chosen whether there are party alternatives or not. By contrast, others may be so rich in "civic culture" that demagogic candidates could never be tolerated and the educative effects of party may then be redundant. Though parties might be present in the electoral situation, their independent effect on demagogic support potential would be small indeed. In intermediate cultural conditions, however, demagogues may not be unthinkable, but parties, should they be present, may provide meaningful symbols to which electorates respond in preference to demagogic appeals.

These propositions are clearly of great importance, for they deal with the conditions under which party can be an effective instrument in the determination of the kind of rule which electorates will choose, i.e., in the determination of the stability of democracy. It is to a test of these propositions that we now turn.

Method. Systematic research of the above no-

²² Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 74-77.

²³ Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1961), pp. 21-28, 35-38.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

tions requires a design in which voter choice of demagogues is always possible, in which there is variation in the presence and absence of meaningful party symbols, and in which there is cultural variation. The extreme difficulty of realizing these desiderata in a real world situation, not to mention the problems of control of variables, necessitated a quasi-experimental approach. Data were gathered from 847 residents of the Lexington, Kentucky metropolitan area. A randomized cluster sample of all housing units in the area was drawn, and this served as a basis for the selection of respondents. Several standard instruments and modes of soliciting data were employed to provide information on social, personal, and political variables.

Clearly, there is no cultural variation among the subjects in that they are not drawn from various distinct cultural units; they are indeed all from the same local community. However, this problem is obviated if we consider as the definition of culture, "that of psychological orientation toward social objects."²⁵ We need not assume cultural homogeneity within a given area; in fact, it may be dangerous to do so. The culture of an area is the particular distribution of patterns of these orientations. Within our sample, there is considerable variation in relevant orientations and we can therefore deal quite nicely with culture. The three psycho-cultural variables of concern to us, allegedly of great importance for the character of political support, are alienation, anomie, and sense of citizen duty.²⁶

The other relevant variables, electoral selection of demagogic candidates, and opportunity to structure voting situations in terms of partisan alternatives, are somewhat more difficult to approach. The lack of general agreement as to what constitutes a demagogue makes operationalization of the concept somewhat arbitrary. Our assessment of the literature plus the necessity of experimental manipulation led us to approach the task in the following way. A pool of "extreme" programmatic statements, such as

²⁵ Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²⁶ Alienation is measured by the Survey Research Center's Political Efficacy Scale, Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954). pp. 187-194; anomie is measured by a version of Srole's instrument, see Edward L. McDill and Jean Clare Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation and Political Participation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (September, 1962), 205-213; The measure of sense of citizen duty is also taken from the Survey Research Center's arsenal, Campbell, *et al.*, *The Voter Decides*, pp. 194-199.

might be uttered in a campaign, was assembled by the authors. The items referred to four issue areas: the Viet Nam war, internal communist subversion, federal centralization of government prerogatives, and civil rights or racial conflict. Most of the statements were adaptations of remarks made by figures who have at one time or another, justly or unjustly, been called demagogues. The statements were then submitted to the members of the political science department of the University of Kentucky, who were asked in light of *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences'* definition, to rank the statements on a five-point scale for their degree of demagogic content. Those statements in each of the four issue areas which received the highest cumulative scores were accepted for use in the instrument. Respondents were subsequently presented with these statements which were attributed to a candidate for Congress. Their choice of this candidate over others is regarded as evidence of attraction to demagoguery. Admittedly, this scheme does not tap all of what seems to be involved in the notion of demagoguery. Here we have only the content of an appeal. Certainly demagoguery does not flourish only because of the words used. The way they are said, the intensity and frequency of the presentation, the appearance of the presenter, and possibly the nature of available sanctions, may all play a role in demagoguery. However, few observers of the phenomenon exclude content,²⁷ and thus it would be a denial of considerable consensus to do so. We are measuring at least one aspect of the phenomenon, and perhaps the one most amenable to systematic observation. Thus equipped with hypothetical candidates who make demagogic utterances, we established a basic experimental design as follows: (1) All respondents were forced to choose one of the four issue areas as most salient; (2) The direction of each respondent's policy preference within the selected issue area was ascertained; (3) With the appropriate policy preference reflected in the content of some of the alternatives offered, each respondent was asked in which of four hypothetical elections he would most likely participate; and (4) He was asked how he would vote in that election. Hence, each respondent was given printed information about eight candidates—opposed pairs in four hypothetical elec-

²⁷ Allen Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), especially pp. 43-46; Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, "Democratic and Totalitarian Propaganda," in Leonard Fein (ed.), *American Democracy: Essays on Image and Realities* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 55-60; and Lipset, *op. cit.*, Chapter 5.

tions. The elections were characterized in the following way: *Election I*, candidates of differing personal characteristics (one "attractive" and the other "unattractive"); *Election II*, candidates opposed in that one was "demagogic" in what he said while his opponent's only known characteristic was that he disagreed with the demagogue; *Election III*, candidates who took opposed but moderate stances on issues; and *Election IV*, candidates of different parties. Information about these candidates was rigidly controlled. Respondents knew nothing about the candidates in Election I except their personal characteristics; nothing about the candidates in Election III except their issue stances, and so on. There was no information about the candidates to which our subjects could respond except the designated features. Names were not even attached for fear of activating ethnic loyalties. In Elections II and III candidates addressed themselves to a policy area (one of four) previously ascertained to be of most concern to the respondent. Moreover, in Election II the demagogic candidate's remarks were always in the *direction* that the respondent's preferences had been determined to lie.²⁸ To reduce the possibil-

²⁸ For example, a respondent who indicated that racial conflict was the most salient of the four issues, and who further indicated that his personal position was pro-Negro, was presented with a hypothetical demagogic candidate in election II to whom the following statement was attributed: "Every white man in the south is an uncivilized dog. His record of lynchings proves it. There is no white man's justice; justice comes only when the black man takes it by force." A person choosing the same issue but indicating an anti-Negro stand was presented with a hypothetical demagogue who said, "We have a right to keep niggers from moving in next door to us and we have a right to use force to do it. We must preserve western Christian civilization. Would you want your daughter to marry a nigger?" The statement attributed to a demagogue was not always the direct counterpart of that attributed to the demagogue on the opposite side of the same issue, nor was it necessarily directly parallel to the "less extreme" statement attributed to an issue-oriented candidate in election III. This was due to the fact that our operation for generating demagogic statements sometimes produced items with less specificity of reference than those used for issue-oriented candidates. On the ground that our experts seemed to believe it was the nature of demagoguery to avoid issue-specificity, we did not interpose our own judgement. As an example of the format of the electoral choice instrument, we present the entire configuration of options offered to respondents who choose

ity that the instrument itself would affect the choice, the information about each of the eight candidates occupied about the same number of printed lines. Interviewers read the information

Vietnam as the most salient issue, and who indicated a pro-involvement posture. The complete instrument can be obtained from the authors.

ELECTION #1

Candidate "A" is in his early thirties and has a reputation for energy and drive. He is married, has three children, and is active in his church. He is a lawyer. He recently received an award for distinguished service to his community.

Candidate "B" is a middle aged bachelor who is employed with a business firm which recently moved to Lexington from Pennsylvania. It is rumored that he is secretly engaged to a woman twenty years younger than himself.

ELECTION #2

Candidate "C" says, "The only language the communists understand is war. Your children will be safe only when our armies have killed every last communist. The Lord is on our side in Viet Nam. To fight on to total victory is the wish of the blessed Saviour."

Candidate "D" says, "One thing about this campaign is clear. My opponent and I are in very great disagreement on almost every point. The voters must choose between two programs. Mine is the most beneficial for all citizens."

ELECTION #3

Candidate "E" says, "Because of the necessity of containing communism, we must remain in Viet Nam. It is simply smart world politics to stop the efforts of the expansionist powers. If they succeed, they will go after more."

Candidate "F" says, "We must weigh the cost of staying in Viet Nam against what we gain. I believe that the costs are too high and the gain too small. I propose that we cut our costs by withdrawing from this conflict."

ELECTION #4

Candidate "G" is a *Democrat*. He has stated that he respects the principles of his party and believes that Democrats can be important influences in achieving excellent government for all citizens.

Candidate "H" is a *Republican*. He has stated that he is impressed with the prospects for his party in the years ahead, and has pledged to make a good image for Republicans in all that he does.

about each candidate aloud with the respondent to insure that all alternative choices had been cognized.

Manipulation of the opportunity to structure electoral alternatives in terms of party was accomplished by denying a random half of the sample access to the hypothetical partisan election. This half, hereafter called the experimental group was required to choose among three elections and six candidates, selecting on the bases of candidate personal characteristics, issue position, or demagogic features. The remaining half, the control group, of course received partisan stimuli, which, given its probable life-long exposure to the "educative" efforts of Democrats and Republicans, should have been meaningful.²⁹

Although this design controls many potentially contaminating variables and allows considerable manipulation, it has certain liabilities.

²⁹ This technique is similar to the "split ballot" discussed in Hadley Cantrill, *Gauging Public Opinion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 23ff. Split ballots, by presenting different wordings or alternate forms of items to separate but matched subsamples, reveal response differences which are artifacts of instrumentation. In this study, such response differences, due to alternate instrumentation, are used as a measure of the dependent variable. Sound experimental research, of course, requires that there be no relevant contaminating differences between experimental and control groups. We sought to achieve this by random assignment of respondents. That we were successful is demonstrated in the table below. Tests for differences were performed on several variables. In no case was there anything approaching a significant difference.

COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS

Variable	Test
alienation	$D = .058$
anomie	$D = .035$
sense of citizen duty	$D = .080$
party identification	$D = .084$
education	$D = .074$
income	$D = .054$
sex	$Z = .035$
race	$Z = .008$

Where data are in ordinally arranged categories, the Smirnov two-sample test is employed. Dichotomous data require the difference of proportions test. In all cases, $p > .50$. Obviously, these variables could produce no observed differences in behavior.

Obviously, the respondents are not actually politically supporting demagogus by their hypothetical voting choices nor are they actually operating in party or non-party contexts. They are participating in an experimental situation. This, however, is not an overpowering defect. A great deal has been learned about human behavior through psychological experimentation for example. The truly remarkable thing is how little experimentation is used in political science.³⁰ The advantage of being able to abstract concepts for research—especially such basic ones as are discussed here—outweigh the consideration that we are not directly observing overt participation in the political process.³¹

The viability of our procedures has been established elsewhere.³² Suffice it to say here that response patterns carry no hints that subjects treated their hypothetical choices capriciously. Many of the emergent data are thoroughly consistent with what has been found in studies of actual electoral behavior.

³⁰ Many scholars including philosophers of science urge experimentation on the study of politics despite the obvious difficulties of implementation in field situations. The advantages of manipulation and control of variables and of relatively easy replication outweigh these considerations. H. J. Eysenck, *The Psychology of Politics* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), p. 252; Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 145-147; Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 359, 375-391; John R. P. French, Jr., "Experiments in Field Settings," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (eds.), *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1953), pp. 98-135; Samuel A. Stouffer, "Some Observations on Study Design," *American Journal of Sociology*, 55 (January, 1950), 355-361.

³¹ Some scholars have successfully employed experimental method in the study of politics. One work employing a design especially similar to ours is Leon J. Kamin, "Ethnic and Party Affiliations of Candidates as Determinants of Voting," *Canadian Journal of Psychology*, 12 (March, 1958), 205-213. Other experimental studies of political behavior include the works of Theodore Becker, most of which builds upon his *Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1964); see also J. A. LaPonce, "An Experimental Method to Measure the Tendency to Equibalance in a Political System," *This Review*, 60 (December, 1966), 982-993.

³² See the authors' forthcoming "Alienation and Support for Demagogues," *Polity*, 1 (June, 1969).

Findings: The Political Explanation. Do party symbols in fact independently contribute to the unattractiveness of demagogic candidates? This question can be approached by manipulating party symbols in the electoral situation and by comparing those persons for whom party is very salient with those for whom it is not.

We accomplish the first by comparing our experimental and control groups with respect to propensity to choose demagogic candidates. The denial of partisan electoral alternatives to our experimental group appears dramatically to increase their attraction to demagogues (Table I). Indeed, these results are very consistent with those in the literature on non-partisan elections and referenda. Our confidence in the implications of this literature is increased, however, because of the tighter control of possibly contaminating variables in this quasi-experimental context.

Second, do those persons who do not identify with a political party, who generally reject par-

TABLE I. EFFECT OF PARTISAN ALTERNATIVES ON CHOICE OF DEMAGOGUES

	Experimental Group (N = 400)	Control Group (N = 427)
Demagogic choice coefficient*	.53	.33

* Demagogic Choice Coefficient (DCC) is simply f_o/f_e calculated from the distribution of electoral choices within the two groups. That is, since there were six discrete options available to members of the experimental group, random distribution would place one-sixth of the 386 subjects responding or 64.3 in the demagogic category. Only 34 subjects were observed so to choose, however. Hence the DCC for the experimental group is $34/64.3$ or .53. The control group had eight electoral options owing to the addition of two partisan choices. Thus, f_e of demagogic choice is one-eighth of the 418 subjects responding or 52.2. However, $f_o = 17$; hence $DCC = 17/52.2 = .33$. The use of such calculations rather than raw percentages is necessary because of the disparity in the number of choices available. The raw percentages of respondents choosing demagogic candidates, though their absolute values are of relatively little meaning given their heavy dependence both upon the number and kind of other electoral choices available, are for the experimental group, 9%; for the control group, 4%.

TABLE II. EFFECT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION ON CHOICE OF DEMAGOGUES

	Democrats (N = 428)	Independents (N = 198)	Republicans (N = 197)
Demagogic Choice Coefficient	.49	.36	.41

tisan criteria for electoral choice, show a greater propensity to choose extremist candidates? Like the respondents of the experimental group, we would expect independents to operate in a condition—albeit self-imposed—which is devoid of party choice criteria. If so, they should indeed be more attracted to demagogues than those who identify with party. However, Table II reveals that this is not the case. In fact, the independents are less attracted than either Democrats or Republicans. Insofar as these data are concerned, this political explanation fails. The cultural attributes of the Republicans (e.g., as determined by sense of citizen duty or alienation), partially dependent upon social variables such as wealth and education, may help to explain the fact that their DCC is lower than that of the Democrats. However, a similar cultural explanation cannot be mustered to account for the low DCC of the independents. Although the independents of our sample are neither as politically inert nor as politically alienated as the stereotypic independent one envisages from contemporary voting studies, neither are they rich in civic culture.³³ Indeed, we have no data to explain the anomaly of the independents.³⁴

The political explanation fares a little better when we consider the effect of denial of party alternatives together with party identification. Such denial of course increases the propensity to choose demagogues of both party identifiers and independents (Table III). However, the effect is least visible among independents and most pro-

³³ Though there are problems of rapidly diminishing cell size, attempts at controlling the DCC-party identification relationship for cultural attributes generally reduces slightly the magnitude of Republican-Democratic differences; the independents, however, retain the lowest DCC scores. That the DCC's of the party identification groups are not mere reflections of distributions of cultural or social attributes is evident from the following data. The party identification groups are remarkably homogenous. Republicans are of slightly higher social status and approximate the civic culture more closely than Democrats or independents. However, these differences attain statistical significance on only two of six variables.

³⁴ We suspect that there is a political explanation

TABLE III. PARTISAN ALTERNATIVES, PARTY IDENTIFICATION, AND CHOICE OF DEMAGOGUES

	Experimental Group			Control Group		
	Democrat (N = 216)	Independent (N = 90)	Republican (N = 78)	Democrat (N = 202)	Independent (N = 106)	Republican (N = 114)
Demagogic Choice Coefficient	.61	.40	.47	.32	.30	.36

nounced upon Democrats. This is in line with what we would expect; since party is less salient to independents, the non-availability of partisan alternatives should have relatively little impact on the criteria they employ in electoral choice. The dramatic increase in the propensity of experimental group Democrats to choose demagogues and the relatively small parallel increase among Republicans is undoubtedly due to the traditional Democratic dominance of the area. Republicans have been conditioned to rely less on party label for political guidance. They may rely on other electrical criteria, and hence denial of partisan alternatives is not a highly disorienting experience. Democrats, on the other hand, have been steeped in party symbols and hence should rely upon them more. Sudden removal of this structuring variable would understandably disorient them. This disorientation appears to result in increased choice of demagogic electoral alternatives.

It is clear that the existence of party symbols decreases the likelihood of voters choosing demagogic candidates. The political explanation of the simultaneous presence of democratic stability and viable parties is supported by these data. Despite the fact that our expectations about party identification were not met, the ex-

istence of partisan alternatives undeniably affected the behavior of our subjects. Party seems in and of itself a causal agent in decreasing attraction to demagogues and thus promoting stability.

The Cultural Explanation. As noted above, much literature suggests that political stability, and hence the unattractiveness of demagogues, is dependent upon cultural antecedents. Though—somewhat at variance with this literature—our data suggest an independent effect of parties, they do not preclude the possibility of cultural variables having a simultaneous impact. Various works suggest that a cluster of psychological orientations toward political objects is at the root of stable political order. This cluster is composed of a large number of variables—among them, certainly, alienation, anomie, and

for the independents' low DCC, but of a slightly different kind. Evidence collected by Malcolm Jewell suggests that some southern independents may be in a transitional stage between Democratic party identification and Republican party identification. Such persons are dealing with their dissatisfaction with the Democrats decidedly within the partisan context. Consequently, demagogues may not be attractive to them.

Mean Values on Cultural and Social Variables of Party Identification Groups

	Democrats (N = 428)	Independents (N = 198)	Republicans (N = 197)	Kruskal-Wallis Test, Value of H
Alienation	3.04	3.04	2.88	2.68, $p > .05$
Anomie	2.55	2.46	2.22	8.90, $p < .05$
Sense of Citizen Duty	4.01	3.97	4.16	5.76, $p > .05$
Campaign Activity Index	1.84	1.77	1.95	3.77, $p > .05$
Education*	5.02	5.38	5.47	10.66, $p < .01$
Income*	2.98	3.09	3.37	5.44, $p > .05$

* The means for these variables are calculated from the ordinal numbers assigned to categories into which respondents classified themselves.

feelings of obligation to participate in politics.

Thus, we would expect persons who exhibit low levels of alienation and anomie and an acute sense of citizen duty to eschew demagogic electoral alternatives.³⁵ We investigated this proposition by examining the relationship of these three cultural variables to choice of hypothetical demagogic candidates. Table IV reveals that our expectations are met. In fact, with the distribution of scores on the independent variables trichotomized, there is a monotonic progression of the Demagogic Choice Coefficient in the anticipated direction for all three variables.

³⁵In additions to suggestions in Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, clear evidence confirming this expectation is found in the authors' "Alienation and Support for Demagogues," *op. cit.*

TABLE IV. EFFECT OF CULTURAL VARIABLES ON DEMAGOGIC CHOICE COEFFICIENTS


	Low	Moderate	High
Anomie	.21	.52	1.21
Alienation	.16	.43	.70
Sense of Citizen Duty	1.53	.61	.28

Hence, attraction to demagoguery, in addition to being dependent upon party, is partially explained by cultural variables. Since we know by virtue of our experimental controls that the effects attributed to party cannot be due to the uncontrolled presence of these cultural variables, it appears that both the political and cultural

TABLE V. EFFECT OF CULTURAL VARIABLES AND PARTISAN ALTERNATIVES ON DEMAGOGIC CHOICE COEFFICIENTS

	Experimental Group			Control Group		
	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	High
Anomie	.26	.59	1.47	.14	.42	.89
Alienation	.22	.43	.83	.10	.43	.51
Sense of Citizen Duty	1.89	1.00	.27	.97	.15	.29

FIG. 1. The Interaction of Cultural Variables and Partisan Alternatives in Their Effects Upon Demagogic Choice.



explanations have elements of validity. Neither explanation can be discarded in its entirety. It thus remains to be asked just how these two sets of variables interact to produce their effects upon attraction to demagogues. It is clear that the party choice variable operates among persons of all cultural orientations (Table 5).

We posited that the availability of partisan electoral alternatives would have its smallest effect when values of the cultural variables approached extremes. Anomic, alienated persons who are weak in feelings of civic obligation may be beneath a cultural threshold where partisan symbols can be meaningful. On the other hand, persons with opposite cultural complexions may find the educative effects of party superfluous. The existence of partisan symbols should operate most effectively on those persons who are between these cultural extremes. An examination of Table 5 reveals that this is not the case. The graphing of these data (Figure 1) clearly shows an unanticipated interactive pattern. Instead of finding that removal of party produced the greatest effects at moderate cultural levels, we note that the largest impact is at one extreme. While persons rich in civic culture appear to be so disinclined to choose demagogues that party is largely redundant, it is definitely not the case that citizens of opposite orientations are beneath a level where partisan symbols are meaningful. Instead the relationship is linear: the more cultural variables conduce toward choice of demagogues, the greater is the sensitivity of this choice to the presence of party symbols.

IV. CONCLUSION

There is some evidence that where voters are able to respond to party symbols, very moderate political behavior takes place. This phenomenon has been attributed to 1) the educative effects of parties *per se* (the political explanation) and 2) to the holding of particular "psychological orientations toward social objects" by citizens (the cultural explanation). Advocates of the first seem to feel that parties inhibit voters from indulging immoderate predispositions, while defenders of the second would argue that moderation (and viable parties) are dependent upon the *absence* of any such predispositions. This paper, by demonstrating that voters' propensities to choose demagogic political candidates is dependent both upon availability of party symbols and upon cultural variables, lends support to both arguments. In addition, it attempts to specify the cultural conditions under which party symbols can be particularly effective variables.

The number of efforts directly and systematically to investigate the roots of political stability and instability is small. Despite the inaccessibility of behavioral manifestations of these conditions (like the attractiveness of demagogues), attempts should be made to research them. Though the findings of this paper do not confirm all of our expectations and though the relationships shown are not all startlingly dramatic, they do demonstrate the feasibility of quantitative inquiry into these kinds of classic political concerns.

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⁹ **Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States**

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¹³ **Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums**

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